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OPTIMIZING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH 
CARE 
ANNE MARIE HELM* 
ABSTRACT 
Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in 
large part due to insufficiently competitive markets. Waves of consolidation have 
fortified providers and insurers with market power, resulting in higher prices 
and lower quality for consumers. As antidotes, advocates have proposed various 
legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions. Yet, unlike public antitrust 
enforcement, private antitrust enforcement is either not mentioned or criticized 
as sour grapes from competitors or a money grab by consumers. Instead of 
ignoring or bashing private litigation, those looking to address the health care 
pricing crisis in the United States should be looking to optimize it. Effective 
private enforcement can restore competition, deter antitrust violations, and 
compensate victims in the markets for health care services and insurance. For 
plaintiffs, the key to optimizing private antitrust enforcement is overcoming the 
unavoidable challenges in litigating these cases—from satisfying pleading 
standards and establishing standing, to defining relevant markets. This article 
explains the key obstacles involved in these cases and tracks recent and current 
plaintiffs whose experiences provide insight. 
  
 
* Chief of Staff to the Chancellor & Dean, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; 
Co-founder, The Source on Healthcare Price and Competition (sourceonhealthcare.org). Many 
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project. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in 
large part due to insufficient competition among providers and payors.1 Waves 
of consolidation in these markets have fortified providers and insurers with 
market power, resulting in higher prices and lower quality for consumers.2 As 
antidotes, health economists and other policy advocates have proposed various 
legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions.3 Yet private antitrust 
enforcement is rarely recommended to remedy health care market dysfunction. 
Whereas public antitrust enforcement is generally touted as indispensable,4 
private antitrust enforcement is often disregarded as baseless, self-serving 
litigation that only strains judicial resources and may even raise costs.5 But the 
notion that private litigation is important should not be controversial.6 Private 
 
 1. MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS WORK: COMPETITION 
POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 1 (Apr. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf. 
 2. See Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to 
the Center of Health Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/ 
06/03/acknowledgingthe-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-poli 
cy/; WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS HOSPITAL 
CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 1, 8 (Feb. 2006), 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf12056_
1; MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 1–3 (June 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/ 
2012/06/the-impact-of-hospital-consolidation.html; MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTH 
CARE MARKETS WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 1 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf; 
Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health 
Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1163 (2012) (finding that health insurance 
consolidation between 1998 and 2006 led to a seven percent increase in large group health 
insurance premiums); José R. Guardado et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Health 
Insurers: A Case Study of UnitedHealth-Sierra, HEALTH MGMT., POL’Y & INNOVATION 8 (2013) 
(finding the UnitedHealth Group and Sierra Health Services merger increased the post-merger 
premiums in the Nevada markets by 13.7 percent, suggesting that the merging parties exploited the 
market power gained from the merger); PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. 
CHANGE, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF 
PROVIDER MARKET POWER (Nov. 2010). 
 3. See, e.g., GAYNOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 17, 23, 28–29 (recommending: (1) changes to 
laws on information sharing, certificate of need laws, and certificates of public advantage; (2) new 
legislation banning anti-competitive contract clauses; and (3) increased federal and state antitrust 
enforcement). 
 4. See, e.g., Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care—Controlling Costs, 
Improving Quality, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2014). 
 5. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden et al., Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using All the 
Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227–34 (2011) (disputing Lande & Davis’s 
findings). 
 6. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private 
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315, 315 
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antitrust enforcement can restore competition, deter antitrust violations, and 
compensate victims in the markets for health care services and insurance, and, 
accordingly, the United States should be looking for ways to optimize it.  
When passed, the antitrust statutes envisioned private cases as a fundamental 
part of an overall enforcement scheme.7 Indeed, the treble damages remedy was 
meant to spur private litigation.8 The Supreme Court has acknowledged as 
much: “By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times 
the amount of their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as 
‘private attorneys general.’”9 The Court later elaborated, “The treble-damages 
provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust 
enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential violators.”10 Over 
the last century, private cases have greatly outnumbered public enforcement 
actions.11 Recently, however, “private actions have caught up in the well-
 
(2011) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence] (arguing that private antitrust 
litigation is more effective than Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal enforcement at deterring 
cartels); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, The Extraordinary Deterrence of Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Reply to Werden, Hammond, and Barnett 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 173, 185–86 
(2013) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Extraordinary Deterrence]. 
 7. The private right of action under the antitrust laws is (are) contained in Sections 4 and 16 
of the Clayton Act, which apply respectively to actual and threatened injuries. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 
(2012). Section 4 provides: “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United 
States.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). Under both provisions, the “antitrust laws” include the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). However, the “antitrust laws” do not include Section 
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). This is distinct from the legal framework 
in most other countries, as the United States provides some of the broadest access to private parties 
in antitrust. See Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies Under US Law, 1 PLC CROSS-
BORDER COMPETITION HANDBOOK 87, 87 (2006–2007), https://www.steptoe.com/assets/attach 
ments/2804.pdf. Many countries limit enforcement to governmental entities, and, where private 
remedies are available, those remedies are typically more limited in scope. See Ewing, supra, at 
87, 91; see also Nicholas Heaton & Benjamin Holt, Know-How: Private Litigation, GCR, 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/know-how/topics/1000309/private-litigation-2017 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (providing a database of comparative international competition laws) (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
 8. By statute, plaintiffs are entitled to the treble damages remedy, which provides for 
recovery of “threefold the damages by [the plaintiff] sustained, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
 9. Hawaii v. Std. Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (“A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely 
a private matter.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 723 F.2d 
155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983); American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., Inc. 391 F.2d 
821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 10. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635. 
 11. Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the Dog?: Sixty Years of Government and Private 
Antitrust in the Federal Courts, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1–3 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ameri 
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Dec09_Godek12_17f.authcheckdam.pdf; 
see also Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 
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orchestrated, ideologically driven ‘tort reform’ movement” and have been 
characterized as “legalized blackmail” as opposed to a vital component of our 
statutory antitrust scheme.12 Private antitrust enforcement does not deserve this 
characterization and indeed is a much needed means to address health care 
pricing.  
Antitrust law is premised on the notion that competition leads to lower costs, 
higher-quality products and services, and encourages investment and 
innovation. In health care, as former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair 
Edith Ramirez stated, “The success of health care reform in the United States 
depends on the proper functioning of our market-based health care 
system.”13 Although highly regulated and somewhat complicated by the buyer 
and seller relationships among patients, providers, and payors, health care in the 
United States is nonetheless market-based. As such, the sector depends on 
competition to drive prices down and quality up, even after the at-risk Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.14 There is a real need for more antitrust 
enforcement in health care. As to hospital mergers, a named top public 
enforcement priority,15 the FTC has only challenged one percent of mergers over 
the past decade.16 And, even with both the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) enforcing the federal antitrust laws, the lower-priority cases challenging 
anti-competitive conduct are even more scant, and criminal cases are rarer still.17 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 585 (2002) (describing empirical study of antitrust cases in health care 
between 1985 and 1999: “Of the 542 opinions in our sample, only 31 (representing 22 disputes) 
involved cases brought by the DOJ (10 disputes), the FTC (11 disputes), or state attorneys general 
(1 dispute)”). 
 12. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Am. Antitrust Inst., Restoring the Legitimacy of 
Private Enforcement, in A REPORT TO THE 45TH PRESIDENT (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1), 
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2017&context=all_fac. 
 13. Ramirez, supra note 4, at 2245. 
 14. The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition: Hearing on Serial No. 114-46 Before the Subcomm. 
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (Sept. 10, 2015) (statement 
of Thomas L. Greaney, Professor) (noting that the ACA “relies on (1) competitive bargaining 
between payers and providers and (2) rivalry within each sector to drive price and quality to levels 
that best serve the public”). 
 15. See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Hal White Antitrust 
Conf. 1, 3–4 (June 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/3148 
61/140609halwhite.pdf (exclusively discussing hospital merger enforcement in a speech on health 
care and competition, including a historical discussion and specific discussion of recent Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) hospital merger victories). 
 16. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, American 
Antitrust Institute Health Care Roundtable: Competition & Health Care—Enforcement & Policy 
Priorities 18 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1120 
623/feinstein_aai_speech_2-22-17.pdf. 
 17. See id.; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN 
HEALTH CARE (Aug. 1996), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/00 
00.pdf. 
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In this void, private antitrust enforcement is essential to address market power 
in health care, and one that assumes a role that public enforcement cannot—or 
does not—presently fill.18 
The insufficiency of public enforcement to address antitrust concerns in 
health care will likely only be exacerbated by the new presidential 
administration, under which at least one commentator has noted that “it is fair to 
expect some tempering of the level of activity that characterized the Obama 
administration.”19 Generally, Republican administrations are less likely to 
intervene in transactions and challenge the conduct of businesses, and despite 
some campaign rhetoric to the contrary, President Trump’s appointments seem 
to indicate an approach more in line with the party than with a new populism.20 
Of course, political influence is not limited to the federal realm; in states, the 
political priorities of elected attorneys general influence antitrust policy as well. 
Nevertheless, even the most aggressive public enforcement scheme would be 
incapable of addressing antitrust issues in health care without its private cousin.  
What can private antitrust enforcement accomplish? Effective enforcement 
achieves deterrence, compensates victims,21 and maintains or restores 
competition in health care markets. Private enforcement allows health care 
entities to police their own markets and consumers to seek relief from anti-
competitive acts. But it is often said that antitrust laws are meant to protect 
competition and consumers, not competitors.22 The concern is that entities, 
acting in their own self-interest, will use the antitrust laws to try to modify 
contracts, redress various business torts, stifle competition, and extort 
settlements from rivals.23 Despite criticisms that private suits are self-interested 
and therefore anti-competitive, a lawsuit can be both self-interested and pro-
 
 18. See Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1305 
(11th Cir. 2010) (noting that due to limited resources, the government is not necessarily a better 
plaintiff than a competitor). 
 19. Maria Raptis, Skadden Discusses Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration, THE 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 19, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/19/skadden-dis 
cusses-antitrust-enforcement-in-the-trump-administration/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 315–18 (arguing that 
private antitrust litigation is more effective than DOJ criminal enforcement at deterring cartels); 
Lande & Davis, Extraordinary Deterrence, supra note 6, at 174. 
 22. Marivin Ammori, Monopolies: Antitrust Law Protects Consumers, Not Competitors, 
WIRED (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/antitrust-is-supposed-to-protect 
-consumers-not-competitors/. 
 23. R. Preston McAfee et al., Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or 
Anticompetitive?, ANTITRUST DOCUMENTS GROUP 2–5 (Dec. 1, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/private-antitrust-litigation-procompetitive-or-anticompetitive. 
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competitive.24 Indeed, the antitrust laws were written to take advantage of 
private plaintiffs’ incentives and information to bring suits that benefit both 
themselves and consumers.  
Moreover, to limit the likelihood of abuse, courts have narrowed the per se 
doctrine, increased standing requirements,25 and augmented the pleading 
standards; all of which deter frivolous, self-serving suits. In any event, studies 
have shown that antitrust actions by competitors in more concentrated markets, 
like health care markets, are more likely to be pro-competitive than they would 
be in more dispersed industries.26 Some would argue that these measures even 
overdeter and overscreen.27  
How can private antitrust enforcement in health care be optimized? For 
plaintiffs, the key is overcoming the challenges in pursuing antitrust cases in 
health care. Those challenges fall into two groups: (1) those resulting from 
policies designed to decrease the incidence of self-serving and/or frivolous suits, 
and (2) those forming the essence of antitrust matters in health care. 
Understanding both sets is essential to optimizing private antitrust enforcement 
in health care. The first set requires plaintiffs to plead facts in light of new, more 
demanding standards to demonstrate antitrust injury and to attempt to certify 
classes of plaintiffs. The second set includes defining relevant markets and 
selecting claims for a lawsuit. Understanding the sources of these obstacles and 
how other recent plaintiffs have (or have failed to) overcome them is essential 
to optimizing private enforcement’s role in addressing the competition problems 
in health care.  
This article contains three parts. Part II describes how plaintiffs typically use 
private enforcement in health care services and insurance markets. Part III 
addresses the common challenges involved in private antitrust actions in health 
care and suggests strategies based on recent cases.  
II.  HOW PLAINTIFFS USE PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH 
CARE SERVICES AND INSURANCE MARKETS 
Some practitioners and scholars have termed antitrust a “judicial 
enforcement (or ‘law enforcement’) model” because “the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts . . . creat[e] a species of common law, the meaning of which can evolve 
with changing conditions, which gives the federal courts a critical role in 
 
 24. See, e.g., Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2015 
WL 275806, at *7–8, *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (holding that plaintiff whose interests 
overlapped with the public interest in competition among health care providers had standing). 
 25. See William Kolasky, Antitrust Litigation: What’s Changed in Twenty-Five Years?, 27 
ANTITRUST 9, 9–10, 12–13 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court’s changes to the antitrust 
standing requirement with the Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat decision in 1977 put an end 
to the increase in number of antitrust suits (after a quadrupling in the decade prior)). 
 26. McAfee et al., supra note 23, at 12. 
 27. See Lande & Davis, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
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fashioning our competition laws.”28 Accordingly, the development of antitrust 
law is a dynamic process that takes into account changing conditions for which 
the role of the federal courts cannot be understated.29 Health care markets are 
certainly an area in which market conditions have changed over time, and courts 
and litigants have responded. Under these conditions, plaintiffs have evolved 
into litigants who prototype claims and analyses, not always certain how their 
experiments will turn out. The large majority of cases in this realm are brought 
under the Sherman Act, challenging either unilateral or concerted conduct,30 or 
under Clayton Act Section 3, which proscribes exclusive dealing.31 
Notwithstanding, some private litigants have brought merger challenges under 
Clayton Act Section 7, although informational asymmetries and injunctive 
remedies based on potential—as opposed to actual—damages discourage most 
plaintiffs from bringing these cases.32 Occasionally, a Clayton Act claim of an 
impermissible merger is just one claim of many in a private suit alleging a 
 
 28. Mark S. Popofsky & Douglas H. Halward-Driemeier, Antitrust and the Roberts Court, 28 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 26, 26. Plaintiffs typically sue under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012), and the Clayton Act, id. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012). In addition, 
most states (all but Pennsylvania) have antitrust statutes that are largely coextensive with federal 
law. See Dan Packel, Pa. Sen. Proposes Antitrust Law as State Lags Behind Others, LAW360 (Mar. 
15, 2013, 5:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/424213/pa-sen-proposes-antitrust-law-as-
state-lags-behind-others (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). Further, many state antitrust statutes include a 
provision providing that federal antitrust precedents should be used as a guide in interpreting the 
state’s antitrust laws. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (1974) (Construction of Chapter) (“This 
chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purposes in harmony with judicial 
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions.”). 
 29. Popofsky & Halward-Driemeier, supra note 28, at 26. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 31. Id. § 14. 
 32. The government typically has more information about upcoming mergers in light of the 
federal merger pre-notification program created in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2012). Parties planning mergers of a certain size must notify 
the FTC and the DOJ (the antitrust agencies) in advance of proposed deals. Lisl Dunlop & Shoshana 
Speiser, Merger Control in the United States: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW 
(June 1, 2017), https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb49d8761cb511e38578f7ccc38dc 
bee/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bh 
cp=1. After filing the required pre-merger notification forms, the entities may not complete the deal 
until the waiting period expires, the antitrust agencies terminate the waiting period early, or until 
they participate in a more extensive review following a “Second Request” for more information. 
Id. However, occasionally private plaintiffs file merger challenges and the FTC or DOJ follows. 
See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 782 (9th 
Cir. 2015), aff’g 2014 WL 407446 (D. Idaho 2014); Bruce D. Sokler et al., Hospital Wins First 
Round Against Largest Rival in Antitrust Suit Alleging Illegal Exclusive Dealing Agreements with 
Insurers, HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST ALERT (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/ 
2015/Advisories/4811-0315-NAT-AFR-HC/ (“It will likely be a historical footnote that the FTC’s 
seminal St. Luke’s case began as private litigation brought by a rival hospital before the FTC or the 
Idaho Attorney General ever showed up.”). 
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scheme of monopolization and exclusive dealing arrangements in provider-
insurer contracts.33  
In light of the breadth and flexibility of the antitrust statutes, the same facts 
that give rise to an antitrust lawsuit often give rise to other claims. For example, 
a hospital suing another hospital and insurer based on provisions contained in 
the defendants’ contracts might bring the suit as a conspiracy in restraint of trade 
under Sherman Act Section 1, which may involve allegations of exclusive 
dealing arrangements, tying, a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, and/or 
as a monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize case that describes the same 
conduct. The recent fact patterns of several cases in this area are described 
below: 
A. Providers as Plaintiffs 
• A surgical hospital sues a larger hospital(s) and/or insurer, and/or 
managed care organization alleging the defendants acted to keep it out of 
the market for surgical services by conspiring or illegally contracting with 
other providers and/or insurers.34 
• Physician groups sue a health care corporation comprised of hospital and 
insurance plan alleging the health care giant used its market power, gained 
in part from anti-competitive mergers, to obtain exclusive referral 
arrangements aimed at eliminating competitors.35 
• A specialty practice sues a hospital and an insurer for forming a Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) and excluding the specialty practice 
from the HMO’s network.36 
• Providers and insurance subscribers sue a large insurance company 
alleging horizontal market allocation.37 
• A large hospital sues a competitor hospital alleging that the competitor, 
the only local provider of essential services, used its status as a “must-
 
 33. See Third Amended Complaint at 64, 66, 70, 73, 77, 80, 84, 88, 92, Omni Healthcare, Inc. 
v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-01509-RBD-DAB (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014). 
 34. See, e.g., Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936 (6th 
Cir. 2016); Arapahoe Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1260–61 
(D. Colo. 2015); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 
1257, 1263–64 (D. Kan. 2007); Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of 
Tangipahoa Par., 309 F.3d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 2002); Marion HealthCare LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, 
2013 WL 4510168, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26. 2013). 
 35. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-1509-ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL 
275806, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015); N.M. Oncology and Hematology Consultants v. 
Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1197 (D.N.M. 2014). 
 36. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 37. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2017 WL 
2797267, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ala. 2017). 
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have” participating provider to obtain exclusive dealing arrangements 
with commercial health insurers.38  
• A hospital sues a competitor hospital alleging the competitor “leveraged 
a state-granted monopoly in certain medical services” to exclude the 
hospital from local insurance companies’ provider networks by tying 
favorable insurance reimbursement rates for monopolized services to a 
refusal to include the plaintiff hospital in the insurance companies’ 
networks.39 
• A large hospital with its own health plan sues a large insurance company 
alleging the insurance company attempted to block both the hospital’s 
acquisition of a general acute care community hospital and its entry into 
the insurance market.40 
B. Payors as Plaintiffs 
• An insurance company sues a competitor insurance company for using 
most favored nations clauses in insurer-provider contracts alleging that 
the exclusionary clauses drove up health care costs and inhibited 
competition.41 
• Self-funded payors sue a large hospital alleging it overpaid for health 
insurance because of contracts with insurance entities that contained anti-
competitive provisions.42 
C. Consumers as Plaintiffs 
• Purchasers of commercial health insurance sue a large hospital alleging 
the hospital overpaid for health insurance because of provider-insurer 
contracts that contained anti-competitive provisions that require the 
 
 38. Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 859 F.3d 408, 409–10 (7th Cir. 
2017); Complaint at 1–2, Marion HealthCare, LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, No. 3:12-cv-00871-JPG-
PMF (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012). 
 39. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 40. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
148–49 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 41. Aetna, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 11–15346, 2012 WL 2184568, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. June 14, 2012). This lawsuit was a “follow-on” case to the government case of United 
States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, which the government voluntarily dismissed after the 
Michigan state legislature passed a law banning most favored nations clauses in provider-insurer 
contracts. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Files Motion to 
Dismiss Antitrust Lawsuit Against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan After Michigan Passes Law 
to Prohibit Health Insurers from Using Most Favored Nation Clauses in Provider Contracts (Mar. 
25, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-motion-dismiss-antitrust-law 
suit-against-blue-cross-blue-shield (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 42. UFCW & Emp’rs Benefit Tr. v. Sutter Health, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2015). 
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insurer to buy all or none of the hospital’s services and/or prevent insurer 
from steering patients to lower-priced providers.43 
• Individual and small-employer customers sue a large insurance company 
alleging horizontal market allocation.44 
These lawsuits, which seek to combat the effects of market power in health 
care services and insurance markets, have sprung up in response to the growing 
consolidation in those markets, and, accordingly, are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. As a consequence, there is no set structure for a complaint; rather, 
each plaintiff tends to select claims based on case-specific facts and litigation 
strategy. Nonetheless, all plaintiffs must deal with the following key challenges 
in litigating their cases.  
III.  KEY CHALLENGES 
A. Policy-Driven Challenges 
The first key set of challenges plaintiffs face in private antitrust suits are 
those which result from “tort reform,” a term that generally refers to changes to 
the civil justice system to reduce the number of cases filed by plaintiffs, the 
number of cases that survive past the earliest stages of litigation, and/or the 
amount of damages plaintiffs receive.45 Though not based on tort statutes, courts 
in private antitrust cases have imposed the same types of limiting mechanisms 
that ostensibly seek to deter or dispense frivolous lawsuits. In antitrust cases, tort 
reform changes began in the late 1970s when, after early enthusiasm by 
Congress and the courts over private litigants’ role as “private attorneys 
general,”46 the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that reined in private 
antitrust suits by narrowing the per se doctrine and tightening standing 
requirements.47 After years of abridgment, today the per se rule only extends to 
“‘naked’ price fixing and market division agreements, a small subset of boycotts, 
or concerted refusals to deal, and—by a very thin thread—some tying 
 
 43. Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 872–75 (N.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, 667 F. App’x 
641 (9th Cir. 2016); Complaint at 2, DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 2017 WL 
1359599 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2017) (No. 2016 CVS 16404). 
 44. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2797267 (N.D. Ala. 2017); In re 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1179–81 (N.D. Ala. 2014). 
 45. See, e.g., Tort Reform, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 46. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); accord Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (“A claim under the antitrust 
laws is not merely a private matter.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 
Inc. 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 47. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Around 
that time, the Supreme Court also began to limit the per se doctrine, which gives a stronger 
presumption of unreasonableness to certain restraints on trade. See William Kolasky, Antitrust 
Litigation: What’s Changed in Twenty-Five Years, 27 ANTITRUST 9, 11 (2012). 
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arrangements.”48 More recently, in the early 2000s, in response to perceived 
abuses by the plaintiffs’ bar in the form of large class actions, the Supreme Court 
revised antitrust pleading requirements and then all federal pleading 
requirements to prevent meritless cases from proceeding to discovery.49 As a 
result, all plaintiffs in health care antitrust cases face certain procedural obstacles 
as they navigate a system designed to winnow out cases at the earliest stages. 
1. Per se versus Rule of Reason 
The per se rule is the judicially created concept that some antitrust violations 
are so inherently illegal that plaintiffs need to plead and prove only that the 
conduct occurred;50 the anti-competitive effects are implied. After a high point 
in the mid-twentieth century, when numerous antitrust offenses received per se 
treatment, the doctrine has been increasingly limited, either by express 
overruling or increased dubiousness.51 Instead, the rule of reason, “which 
requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market power have 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct,”52 has become the dominant rubric of 
judicial analysis. Under the rule of reason, the court conducts a balancing inquiry 
that determines whether the alleged restraint is reasonable, and, if so, it passes 
antitrust scrutiny.53 Matters are further complicated for litigants by the fact that 
it is not always clear whether a case will receive per se or rule of reason treatment 
until close to its resolution. A plaintiff who arrives at summary judgment having 
declined to prove a case under the rule of reason takes a significant risk54 
because the court could ultimately decide not to apply per se treatment at 
summary judgment:  
[I]f there is any reasonable chance that the court will ultimately require the rule 
of reason, the plaintiff has no choice but to proceed through discovery under that 
rule even if the chance is small. This means that the value of the per se rule is 
lost in a significant number of cases, because the plaintiff must do all of the 
things that rule of reason analysis requires, including developing expert 
testimony on questions about relevant market, market power, and 
anticompetitive effects, even though the case may ultimately be decided under 
the per se rule. At least prior to trial, the greatest cost in litigating a rule of reason 
 
 48. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, PENN L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 
1, 2 (July 2017), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2780&context=fac 
ulty_scholarship (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 559 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678–79, 684 (2009). 
 50. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 51. Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 41. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 380–81 (3d ed. 2010). 
 54. See Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 9. 
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case is the cost of developing a record, so most of the cost savings that the per 
se rule promises will have been lost.55 
In recognition of this predicament, most plaintiffs err on the side of putting 
together a case that anticipates rule of reason analysis.  
In health care, some plaintiffs who have recently pursued exclusively per se 
cases have failed to convince the court of this course, warning future plaintiffs 
of the risks of such a strategy. For example, in one of the cases related to most 
favored nations clauses in provider-insurer contracts in Michigan, the plaintiff 
lost a motion to dismiss after committing to a per se pleading strategy.56 A 
number of other district courts have likewise made clear that vertical 
arrangements, including contracts and agreements between hospitals and 
insurers that are often the subject of lawsuits in this arena, receive rule of reason 
treatment.57 More recently, in Medical Center at Elizabeth Place v. Premier 
Health Partners, a hospital plaintiff, MCEP, that sued the partners of competitor 
hospital group’s joint venture, claiming the joint venture was a conspiracy to 
orchestrate a group boycott (a “non-venture”) to exclude the plaintiff from 
managed care contracts, physicians, and funding, lost at summary judgment 
because of its per se case.58 The district court declined to offer per se treatment 
to the allegations noting that the Supreme Court had a presumption of rule of 
reason analysis particularly with regard to vertical restraints in antitrust cases 
and quoted the Supreme Court’s admonition that “easy labels do not always 
supply ready answers.”59 As part of its lengthy analysis, the district court seemed 
somewhat swayed by the fact that one of the main restraints at issue in the case 
the “panel limitations” clause in contracts between the joint venture member 
 
 55. Id. at 10. 
 56. City of Pontiac v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 11–10276, 2012 WL 1079895, at 
*8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 57. Marion Healthcare, LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, No. 12-CV-00871-DRH-PMF, 2013 WL 
4510168, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013) (agreeing with the defendant that rule of reason is 
appropriate for a case challenging allegedly exclusionary contracts between defendant hospital and 
insurer); Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 1:13-cv-01054-SLD-JEH, 
2015 WL 1399229, at *4, *8 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) (deciding ultimately on foreclosure grounds 
under a rule of reason analysis at summary judgment); see also Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. 
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, No. 11-cv-2652-GPC-RBB, 2013 WL 3873074, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 
2013), aff’d, 642 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2016); Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 
No. 12–cv–05847–JST, 2013 WL 3242245, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). 
 58. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC. v. Premier Health Partners, No. 3:12-cv-26, 2017 WL 
3433131, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2017). 
 59. Id. at *2 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 
(1979)). This case’s loss was particularly tragic for the plaintiff because, after winning on appeal 
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which overturned the district court’s ruling on summary 
judgment that the defendants were a single entity and therefore incapable of a conspiracy, they 
returned to district court, only to lose because their case was brought under the per se rule instead 
of the rule of reason. See id. at *1, *6. 
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hospital defendants and their contracted insurers was a vertical, as opposed to 
horizontal, restraint.60 That clause provided that if the insurer were to add other 
hospitals to its provider network, the hospital would have the option to terminate 
the contract or renegotiate its rates for health care services.61 Plaintiff MCEP 
argued that the restraint deserved per se treatment because the restraint’s 
operation excluded the plaintiff, a horizontal competitor, from the market, which 
the court concluded was too far of a logical leap.62  
The obvious takeaway is that even for a conspiracy case among horizontal 
competitors, like the group boycott and especially one that involves provider-
insurer contracts, as so many of these cases do, the plan should be to plead and 
prove the case under a rule of reason rubric. Thus, even when pleading these 
cases as conspiracies (as is often the case),63 plaintiffs should be prepared to 
establish all facets of a rule of reason case.64 Because, as the court pointed out 
in Elizabeth Place, the restraints at issue are often vertical, even when an alleged 
horizontal conspiracy is involved (e.g., competitor hospital alleges that rival 
hospitals conspired to exclude it from the market by obtaining exclusivity from 
all local insurers), the likelihood of obtaining per se treatment is low.65 Given 
the importance of surviving beyond the pleading stage of private litigation, this 
strategy is even more salient.  
2. Twiqbal 
Despite developing after the antitrust standing doctrine, new pleading 
standards affect all elements of a plaintiff’s case, including standing; this article 
will discuss them first. In 2007, and again in 2009, the Supreme Court 
overhauled the federal civil pleading standards for the first time in sixty years, 
raising the bar considerably for surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.66 Prior to 2007, the federal pleading standard under Rule 8(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP Rule 8) required a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”67 The 
Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation of FRCP Rule 8 was that it required 
 
 60. Id. at *14. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, 2017 WL 3433131, at *14. 
 63. See, e.g., id. at *4; Arapahoe Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 
1257, 1261 (D. Colo. 2015); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (D. Kan. 2007). 
 64. Plaintiffs must establish the following: (1) the defendants conspired; (2) the conspiracy 
produced anti-competitive effects in the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) the conduct 
was illegal; and (4) the scheme was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s antitrust injury. Med. Ctr. 
at Elizabeth Place, 2017 WL 3433131, at *3. 
 65. Id. at *15. 
 66. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678, 684 (2009). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2016). 
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“notice pleading”—i.e., “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”68 The deferential “no 
set of facts” standard—in place from 1957 to 2007—gave the benefit of the 
doubt to the plaintiff, who, as a matter of policy, was presumed to bring a legally 
viable claim unless such claim was essentially inconceivable under the facts 
alleged in the complaint.  
This changed in 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly when the Supreme 
Court ruled that to plead a Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff 
must give the court “plausible grounds to infer an agreement” by filing “a 
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
agreement was made.”69 At first, the new plausibility standard was limited to 
antitrust conspiracy claims under the Sherman Act. Then, two years later in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court extended the plausibility standard to all federal 
claims brought under Rule 8 in federal court and provided further guidance for 
applying the new standard.70 The cases are often discussed and cited together 
and have even been given the moniker Twiqbal as a shorthand. 
The policy behind the Twombly decision was to rein in the perceived misuse 
of the courts by private litigants, especially through class action attorneys, filing 
baseless lawsuits aimed at lucrative damages awards or, more commonly, 
settlements.71 Twombly was part of a larger effort by the Supreme Court to 
discourage the proliferation of large class action suits based on thinly pled 
allegations. The Court cited repeatedly to its decision of two years prior in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo in which it required a higher showing of 
causation at the pleading stage in securities fraud cases, and Twombly made 
sense in that context.72 The Court’s extension of Twombly’s new rule to all 
federal claims two years later in Iqbal was both much more expansive and more 
fraught with controversy. For starters, unlike Twombly, Iqbal was not a class 
action nor an antitrust case nor even a case involving allegations of corporate 
malfeasance; instead, it was a Bivens action, which is an individual’s suit against 
 
 68. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 69. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 70. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. 
 71. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–59 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious 
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only 
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to 
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope 
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”) (alteration in 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)). 
 72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346–47 (2005); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 
557–59, 562 (citing Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346, 347). 
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a federal officer alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.73 In 
other words, whereas Twombly fit the mold of the type of case criticized as an 
instance of opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers suing deep-pocketed corporate 
defendants hoping for a settlement, Iqbal most certainly did not. The plaintiff-
respondent Iqbal had been detained in connection with investigations into the 
September 11, 2001, attacks and had filed suit against multiple federal 
officials.74 In addition, the Supreme Court held that Twombly applied to all 
federal pleadings, and “facts” that were nothing more than legal conclusions 
would no longer suffice in federal pleading; instead, “only a complaint that states 
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”75 The Court then 
explained the new process lower courts should use: “Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”76 In other words, the new plausibility standard was both flexible and 
subjective. Critics argued that the purpose of the FRCP, enacted almost seventy 
years earlier, was to increase ordinary citizens’ access to the federal courts by 
simplifying the historically more technical code pleading, which Iqbal directly 
contravened.77  
Opinions about the actual effects of the new plausibility standards on federal 
cases are varied. A major study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 2011 
concluded that on the whole “Twombly and Iqbal have had a modest effect on 
the resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) motions.”78 Other studies likewise have found 
no statistically significant effect on dismissal rates.79 However, studies focused 
on dismissal rates may ignore “selection effects,” meaning the deterrent effects 
on plaintiffs who may decide not to file a case at all in light of the new 
 
 73. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668, 676. 
 74. Id. at 668 (naming as defendants: John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the 
United States, and Robert Mueller, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 75. Id. at 679 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. (citing the decision on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Iqbal 
v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2007)). 
 77. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10 (2010) (“Federal civil procedure has been 
politicized and subjected to ideological pressures. Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal should be seen as the latest steps in a long-
term trend that has favored increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, 
and avoidance of abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also marks a continued retreat from the 
principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment 
in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. To a significant degree, the liberal-
procedure ethos of 1938 has given way to a restrictive one.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 78. Kevin R. Reich, Five Years After Twombly: Where Are We Now?, 10 ABA ANTITRUST 
SEC. JOINT CONDUCT COMMITTEE E-BULL. no. 1, 2012, at 2. 
 79. William H. J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
474, 475 (2017). 
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plausibility requirement.80 And aggregate effects aside, plaintiffs are required to 
plead their cases in light of the new standard, which comes up in courts’ standing 
analyses as well as substantive considerations like market definition, discussed 
in Part III.  
3. Antitrust Standing 
Antitrust standing, a creature of the common law, imposes a more onerous 
showing than its older cousin, constitutional standing.81 Of course, plaintiffs in 
antitrust suits also must have Article III standing to bring their cases,82 but the 
inquiry is usually collapsed into one “antitrust standing” analysis, whose 
requirements are often distilled into two prongs: A plaintiff must show (1) he 
has suffered antitrust injury and (2) that he is an efficient enforcer, i.e., the 
appropriate plaintiff to bring suit. 83 First, the antitrust injury requirement 
ensures both that the defendant harmed competition or markets (and not just the 
plaintiff, in a more tort-like sense) and that the plaintiff was injured in fact either 
as a direct market participant or as being “inextricably intertwined” with the 
harm resulting from the anti-competitive scheme.84 Next, the efficient enforcer 
requirement ensures that the plaintiff be not too remote, i.e., has suffered directly 
from the defendant’s conduct,85 and is therefore the best plaintiff to bring suit; 
otherwise the best plaintiff might try to sue later on (potentially after damages 
have been awarded to the inferior plaintiff).  
 
 80. Id. at 476. 
 81. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see 
also John J. Miles, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW, § 9:7 n.4 (2017) (collecting cases). 
 82. See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down 
the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 288 n.104 (1998) (citing 
Sanner v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 922–27 (7th Cir. 1995); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1152 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
 83. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 535 n.31 (1983); Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7 n.4. 
 84. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483–84 (1982) (noting that although the 
plaintiff was not a competitor or customer of the defendant, the plaintiff’s injury was “inextricably 
intertwined” with the injury the defendants intended to inflict on the market and others, i.e., it 
“‘flow[ed] from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful’ within the meaning of Brunswick, 
and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional concern”). 
 85. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 288. The danger of allowing recovery by a remote 
plaintiff is that a more directly injured plaintiff would later sue, and the defendant would be put at 
risk of another set of damages. Examples of ill-suited antitrust plaintiffs who typically cannot meet 
the standing requirement “include officers, employees, shareholders, prospective shareholders, 
creditors, guarantors, distributors, brokers, sales representatives, and suppliers of businesses injured 
by the violation.” Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7. 
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a. Antitrust Injury 
Following an uptick in antitrust cases filed by competitors in the mid-
twentieth century, courts became concerned that businesses were using the 
antitrust statutes as federal business tort statutes unrelated to competition or 
consumers. In response, in 1977, the Supreme Court clarified in Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc. that to use the Clayton Act’s private right of 
action, a plaintiff must show “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect 
either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the 
violation.”86 In Brunswick, the Court echoed the seminal Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, explaining: “The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for ‘the 
protection of competition, not competitors.’”87 The Supreme Court further 
clarified in 1990 that antitrust injury required some showing of public harm.88 
The issues of relative injury to the plaintiff and competition have come up in 
two recent antitrust cases brought by hospitals. In Methodist Health Services 
Corp. vs. OSF Healthcare System, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, expressing doubt over the 
plaintiff’s contention that it had brought its case to restore competition on behalf 
of multiple injured parties, none of whom were party to the lawsuit, and 
concluded that the plaintiff was “simply an unsuccessful competitor.”89 On the 
other hand, in another recently settled district court case, Omni Healthcare, Inc. 
v. Health First, Inc., the district court in Florida made clear it would redress 
injuries that were more personal to the plaintiff so long as those injuries 
coincided with an injury to competition and also resulted from the same conduct 
of the defendant.90 Plaintiffs also must show that they suffered direct harm; such 
harm is presumed for competitors and direct customers but not for those who are 
not participants in the relevant antitrust market.91 Some courts include this 
analysis when considering a plaintiff’s remoteness in the antitrust injury prong, 
determining whether the plaintiff was “inextricably intertwined” with the harm 
resulting from the defendant’s conduct, whereas other courts do an almost 
identical analysis under the “efficient enforcer” prong, discussed below.  
 
 
 86. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Brunswick was a 
Clayton Act case, but subsequent Supreme Court cases made clear that the Brunswick rule applied 
equally to cases under the Sherman Act. See Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 482 (applying the 
antitrust injury rule to a claim brought under Sherman I); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 
495 U.S. 328, 334–335 (1990) (holding that antitrust injury is an essential element of every private 
antitrust case, irrespective of the substantive theory of liability); see also Jacobson & Greer, supra 
note 82, at 282. 
 87. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
320 (1962)). This definition of “antitrust injury” was extended to Section 16 cases for injunctive 
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b. Efficient Enforcer 
For the purpose of antitrust standing analysis, the law favors direct 
consumers or customers as plaintiffs.92 Notwithstanding that preference, in 
determining whether the plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws, 
courts in the health care cases at issue vary in their rigidity of applying a 
presumption in favor of a customer or competitor in light of the particular 
characteristics and constituents of those health care markets. As described in 
Part II, recent cases in this arena have seen plaintiffs as the following: hospitals, 
ambulatory surgery centers, physician groups, insurance companies, insurance 
subscribers, and patients. One recent district court clarified that “[t]here is no 
‘bright-line rule’ for determining whether a plaintiff is an efficient enforcer,” 
and instead of strictly assessing the role played by the plaintiff in the market at 
issue, “the ‘efficient enforcer’ requirement ensures that the ‘particular plaintiff 
will efficiently vindicate the goals of the antitrust laws.’”93 Moreover, in cases 
where a plaintiff is not a customer or competitor precisely because of being 
excluded from the market by the defendant’s anti-competitive conduct, courts 
are cognizant that to deny standing on that basis would be inconsistent with the 
policy behind the antitrust laws.94 Finally, courts have demonstrated awareness 
of “efficient enforcer” issues that are inherent in the structure of health care 
markets, where patients may be customers of insurance companies but not of 
providers, who receive payment directly from insurers instead of patients and, 
in such a scenario, have recognized the antitrust standing of insurance plan 
 
relief in 1986. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986); see also CHRISTINE 
L. WHITE ET AL., ANTITRUST AND HEALTHCARE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 61 (2013). 
 88. Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334; see also Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 284. 
 89. Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 859 F.3d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 90. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13–CV–1509–ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL 
275806, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (citing Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 
1450 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 91. Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 472, 480, 483–84 (noting that although the plaintiff was 
not a competitor or customer of the defendant, the plaintiff’s injury was “inextricably intertwined” 
with the injury the defendants intended to inflict on the market and others, i.e., it “‘flow[ed] from 
that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful’ within the meaning of Brunswick, and [fell] squarely 
within the area of congressional concern”). 
 92. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 544–545 (1983); Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7 n.4. 
 93. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13–CV–1509–ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL 
275806, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (quoting Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 
1438, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 94. See, e.g., Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp. 
2d 142, 160 (D.R.I. 2014) (“To permit the defendant in an unlawful exclusion case to hide behind 
the presumptive disfavoring of non-market participants would subject plaintiffs in such cases to an 
insurmountable Catch–22. Were courts to observe a blanket prohibition on claims brought by those 
excluded from the market by alleged anticompetitive conduct, those firms responsible for the 
exclusion might never be held accountable.”). 
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subscribers to sue a provider who contracts with their insurance company.95 
Defendants have largely been unsuccessful in using the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 
or Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois Doctrine, which states that only direct purchasers 
may sue for antitrust violations in these cases.96 
In the recent case Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Memorial 
Hospital, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court’s 
dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff hospital was not an “efficient 
enforcer,” and therefore the plaintiff lacked standing.97 In that case between two 
competing Georgia hospitals, Palmyra alleged that Phoebe Putney had used its 
monopoly power (state-granted by way of a certificate of need) to demand that 
Blue Cross and other insurers exclude Palmyra from their provider networks.98 
Specifically, Palmyra claimed that Phoebe Putney tied favorable reimbursement 
rates to a refusal to include Palmyra in those networks so that insurers who 
included Palmyra in their networks would have to pay Phoebe Putney more for 
the same health care services.99 The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis focused on the 
particular features of health care markets, which led to the holding that Palmyra 
is not only an efficient enforcer but also an ideal plaintiff to bring this suit.100 
Whereas the district court had concluded that “[t]he most direct affect [sic] of 
Defendants’ alleged anticompetitive conduct would be felt by the allegedly 
coerced insurers who pay higher reimbursement rates and the patients who 
ultimately pay higher premiums and co-pays for medical services,”101 the 
appellate court, after analyzing the incentives at play, concluded that those 
insurers had suffered little harm and therefore were unlikely plaintiffs.102 In fact, 
once the tie was in place (i.e., Blue Cross and others agreed to exclude Palmyra 
from its networks in exchange for better reimbursement rates),103 it is unclear 
that the insurers would be paying higher rates at all, and to the extent they were, 
the cost could easily be passed on to their subscribers. Thus, the insurers had 
 
 95. See, e.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1173 n.7, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(dismissing second amended complaint on other grounds). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 1173 n.7 (noting that patients who sued hospital based on its allegedly 
competitive contracts with the insurers whose health plans plaintiffs subscribed to had standing); 
cf. Med. Sav. Ins. Co. v. HCA, Inc., No. 2:04CV156FTM-29DNF, 2005 WL 1528666, at *2, *8 
(M.D. Fla. June 24, 2005) (involving an insurance company that had no contracts with hospitals 
and just paid amounts of charges it deemed “reasonable” that sued hospitals for conspiracy to 
boycott; citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977), the court said patients were the 
more efficient enforcer), aff’d, 186 Fed. App’x 919 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 97. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1296. 
 100. Id. at 1306. 
 101. Id. at 1303–04 (quoting lower court opinion). 
 102. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 604 F.3d at 1305. 
 103. Id. at 1302–03. 
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questionable damages and little incentive to sue, and their subscribers likewise 
may or may not have had damages in the form of increased premiums—and 
organizing and determining this harm would be difficult and likely prohibitive 
to filing suit.104 The most significant effect of the arrangement between Phoebe 
Putney and the insurers was an incentive change for patients: Patients had the 
incentive to go to in-network hospital Phoebe Putney and not out-of-network 
Palmyra because of how insurance companies reimburse for hospital charges.105 
No patient would be willing to pay out of pocket for similar treatment at an out-
of-network hospital, so the contracting arrangement took away demand from 
Palmyra—so much so that the hospital experienced a drop in revenue from 
twenty-four million dollars to six million dollars.106 Indeed, the Third Circuit 
held that “[a]s Phoebe Putney’s chief competitor, Palmyra is undoubtedly well 
suited to vindicate these harms.”107 
c. Special Considerations in Health Care 
In some recent health care antitrust cases, defendants accused of harming 
competition through arrangements that artificially depress prices have argued 
that lower prices benefit, as opposed to harm, consumers.108 This argument fails 
generally because antitrust injury includes harms that result from conspiracies 
to lower prices in contravention of fair and open competition.109 But in health 
care cases, courts have also specifically pointed out that diminishment of quality 
and limitation of access are key in the health care analysis, as patient decisions 
are not made based on price to the same extent that they are in other markets for 
goods and services.110 For example, in the Third Circuit’s reversal in West Penn 
Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPCM, provider West Penn sued competitor 
provider UPMC and insurer Highmark for various antitrust violations, including 
those related to UPMC and Highmark’s agreement that Highmark, who also had 
a business relationship with plaintiff West Penn, was “not to do anything to 
benefit West Penn financially.”111 Pursuant to that agreement, the complaint 
alleged that West Penn had asked Highmark to renegotiate and raise its rates. It 
 
 104. See id. at 1305. 
 105. See id. at 1304. 
 106. Id. at 1302–03. 
 107. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 604 F.3d at 1305 (the court also noting that contrary to the 
district court’s suggestion, the government was not necessarily the best plaintiff in light of limited 
resources). 
 108. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010); 
N.Y. Medscan LLC v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of. Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 109. E.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
central purpose of the antitrust laws . . . is to preserve competition. It is competition—not the 
collusive fixing of prices at levels either low or high—that these statutes recognize as vital to the 
public interest.”). 
 110. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 104. 
 111. Id. at 103. 
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further alleged that although Highmark acknowledged that the rates were too 
low (i.e., below market), Highmark nonetheless refused to raise the rates in light 
of its agreement with UPMC.112 West Penn asserted that it had suffered antitrust 
injury as a result of those depressed rates, and Highmark countered that the 
depressed rates allowed the insurer to offer lower premiums to subscribers and 
to find antitrust injury in this situation would frustrate the purpose of the antitrust 
laws, which is to promote consumer welfare.113 The court rejected Highmark’s 
argument, finding instead that Highmark had not, in fact, passed those savings 
on to subscribers, and doing so likely would have “diminish[ed] the quality and 
availability of hospital services.”114 Similarly, in a district court case in which 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in anti-competitive conduct 
in the market for Positron Emission Tomography and Computed Tomography 
medical scanning equipment, the court was not swayed by the defendant’s 
argument that consumers, and therefore competition, had not suffered because 
prices had not gone up.115 Finding that the plaintiffs had adequately pled 
antitrust injury, the court stated: “Indeed, in the context of the provision of health 
care services for cancer patients, the quality of care is likely to be at least as 
important to patients as the price.”116 Lastly, a district court in New Mexico 
recently found antitrust injury by recognizing that an insurer payment of below-
market reimbursement rates to a provider indicated that insurer’s market power 
in the relevant market, explaining that a monopsonist (seller) with market power 
is every bit as capable of causing antitrust injury as is a monopolist (buyer).117 
Accordingly, in health care, diminution in quality should be considered in any 
discussion of antitrust standing. 
d. Twiqbal 
The standing inquiry in antitrust cases has been further complicated by the 
muddling of standards by lower courts in response to Twombly and Iqbal.118 
Understanding both the development of the antitrust standing rules as well as 
how courts are applying them in health care cases particularly since Twiqbal is 
essential to filing an effective complaint. Outside of health care, some courts, 
 
 112. Id. at 100. 
 113. Id. at 104. 
 114. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 104. 
 115. N.Y. Medscan LLC v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of. Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d, 140, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 116. Id. 
 117. N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants, Ltd. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 54 F. 
Supp. 3d 1189, 1205–06 (D.N.M. 2014). 
 118. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 288; see also Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 
953, 965 (9th Cir. 2013); Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Servs. Emps. Int’l Union, No. 11–cv–
2652–GPC–RBB, 2013 WL 3873074, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2013), aff’d, 642 F. App’x 665 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
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including the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have expressly mingled 
antitrust injury and the plausibility standard for pleading claims by citing 
Twombly and Iqbal to support the proposition that “to state a plausible antitrust 
injury, [the plaintiff] must allege facts that rise beyond mere conceivability or 
possibility.”119 Likewise, in health care, some lower courts are mingling 
Twombly with antitrust injury.120 Be that as it may, the Twiqbal growing pains 
have not necessarily resulted in a stricter standing requirements for plaintiffs. 
For example, in 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of a health care provider’s suit against another provider 
and insurer on the grounds that the district court’s application of Twombly 
overshot the requirements of that case, including as to antitrust standing.121 That 
early district court decision, written in response to a renewed motion to dismiss 
based on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal, was guided by the 
defendant’s insistence that the plausibility “requirement includes pleading facts 
sufficient to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement.”122 The court applied a strict 
version of plausibility to all facets of the complaint. The Third Circuit 
acknowledged the new standard but clarified that it applied equally to all federal 
claims and did not impose heightened pleading requirements for antitrust 
cases.123 
4. Class Certification 
Although private antitrust litigation immediately conjures thoughts of large 
class action cases, most cases involving health care services and insurance 
premiums are individual actions by competitors, unlike the larger consumer 
cases against pharmaceutical companies. The scarcity of class actions in this 
arena is likely due to the individualized nature of damages in health care,124 
 
 119. Somers, 729 F.3d at 695 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
 120. See, e.g., Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 3873074, at *12. In Prime Healthcare 
Services, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, the district court cited Twombly for the 
proposition that the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to allege antitrust injury simply by 
misquoting Twombly to read that the plaintiff’s “allegations must ‘raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence of’ an injury to competition,’” id., whereas Twombly says “raise 
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement,” Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 121. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We 
conclude that it is inappropriate to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard with extra bite in antitrust 
and other complex cases.”). 
 122. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 09CV0480, 2009 WL 3601600, at 
*19 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009), rev’d, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 123. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 98 (“We conclude that it is inappropriate 
to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard with extra bite in antitrust and other complex cases.”). 
 124. See Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (explaining why a patient class might not be the most efficient enforcer). 
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which may deter plaintiffs from trying to satisfy the FRCP 23(b)(3) requirement 
that issues common to the class will predominate over issues specific to 
individual class members in the case.125 Nonetheless, a few notable class actions 
have been filed with some classes certified in this sphere.  
Most famous among the class actions in this area may indeed be the most 
unlikely: Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, a merger challenge 
to the consummated merger of two hospitals in the Chicago area.126 Challenges 
to mergers by the government, of course, are common, and indeed this private 
challenge followed a merger challenge from the FTC. But private plaintiffs 
rarely challenge mergers because of timing issues (mergers are typically 
challenged when they are still in the planning stages, a time when plaintiffs often 
have little information about the deal) and because the typical remedy in a 
merger challenge is an injunction. Although the class was certified after being 
remanded to the district court in 2013, it still feels like somewhat of a one-off—
plaintiffs have not followed suit en masse to challenge mergers in federal court 
either as follow-on cases to FTC merger challenges. Still, the Messner case 
contains valuable language for would-be challengers. Given that after a careful 
examination of the markets for health care services at issue, including that the 
calculation of damages would be affected by factors including “(1) health 
service provider contract negotiation, (2) multi-year contract terms, (3) hospital 
location, reputation, and quality, and (4) prevalent improvements in the 
technology behind certain services,” the court nonetheless concluded that 
predominance issues did not preclude class certification.127 The court explained, 
“Individual questions need not be absent. The text of FRCP 23(b)(3) itself 
contemplates that such individual questions will be present. The rule requires 
only that those questions not predominate over the common questions affecting 
the class as a whole.”128 
Even though Messner has not given rise to a wave of follow-on Clayton Act-
based merger challenges over the past five years, its language was recently relied 
upon by a state court in certifying a class in a challenge to hospital contracting 
provisions brought by self-funded payors in California.129 The court cited the 
Seventh Circuit’s suggestion in Messner that “even in the ‘market for hospital 
services [which] seems to be particularly complex,’ certification may be 
 
 125. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 126. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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 128. Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. 
 129. Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike, Granting Class Certification, and Setting Case 
Management Conference at 9, UFCW & Emp’rs Benefit Tr. v. Sutter Health, Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct (Aug. 14, 2017) (No. CGC 14-538451) (quoting Messner, 669 F.3d at 816). 
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proper.”130 That case, UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust v. Sutter Health, 
contains similar allegations to Sidibe v. Sutter Health, which is back in district 
court after the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal for failure to 
state a claim but has not yet reached class certification.131 Sidibe will be the first 
case in federal court to seek certification for a class of patients (insurance 
subscribers) suing for damages from overcharges related to a hospital’s anti-
competitive clauses in insurer contracts and related tying arrangements (as part 
of a monopolization scheme)—facts similar to those present in several suits 
brought by competitors against hospitals over the past several years.132 
Interestingly, another putative class of plaintiffs has filed a case similar to 
UFCW in state court in North Carolina.133 That case, which is still pre-class 
certification, is distinct in that the plaintiffs chose to file in state court, even 
though the suit was a follow-on to a DOJ matter.134  
Also currently pending, and in pre-class certification, are two large tracks 
(provider plaintiffs and subscriber plaintiffs, respectively) of antitrust class 
actions against Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) entities in multi-district 
litigation in the Northern District of Alabama.135 The plaintiffs alleged that 
BCBS plans and their association used their market power, derived from being 
the dominant insurer in multiple markets, to engage in and profit from the anti-
competitive scheme.136 In the alleged scheme, the individual BCBS plans and 
their national association conspired to carve up insurance markets among the 
insurers across the country in a nationwide market allocation scheme under 
which BCBS plans were allocated a particular market and then would agree not 
to compete with other neighboring BCBS plans in at least seventeen states.137 
The two-tracked litigation presents “a unique case where one class (providers) 
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 132. See, e.g., Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294, 
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Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1262 (D. Colo. 2015). 
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asserts an antitrust injury (low reimbursement rates) which tends to benefit the 
other class (subscribers who may have paid lower premiums as a result),” such 
that “[e]ach class will be putting forth evidence that the other class wasn’t 
injured.”138 It is unclear how this potential conflict and other factors will play in 
the class certification motions, which will be filed soon.  
B. Substantive Antitrust Challenges 
1. Market Definition 
As venerated antitrust scholar Professor Hovenkamp observed, “Markets do 
not define themselves.”139 Litigants define markets, and doing so accurately is 
an exercise not only in economics but also in advocacy. As former FTC 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky stated in 1990, “[A]ntitrust practitioners have long 
known that the most important single issue in most enforcement actions—
because so much depends on it—is market definition.”140 Indeed, market 
definition is not only important to public antitrust, but it is also an essential 
element and one of the main stumbling blocks in private cases. To plead most 
antitrust claims, the plaintiff must define the relevant market in the complaint 
along with the reasoning behind the proposed definition.141 Defining relevant 
markets is a highly fact-specific inquiry,142 which makes doing so in a private 
complaint, before the benefit of discovery, particularly challenging. And 
defendants may, and often do, move to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim 
based on the proposed market definition included in the complaint.143 Indeed, 
market definition is central to most antitrust analyses because “[w]ithout a 
definition of [the relevant] market there is no way to measure [a defendant’s] 
ability to lessen or destroy competition.”144  
Defining a relevant market is the first step towards convincing the fact finder 
that a defendant possesses the legally essential market power over a product or 
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a geographic area. This exercise is required to prove claims under the rule of 
reason, which is the presumptive judicial rubric for most antitrust claims.145 
Once a market is defined, the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant’s market share 
therein—a high share signaling likely market power. Market power is defined 
as “the power to raise prices above competitive levels without losing so many 
sales that the price increase is unprofitable.”146 Firms that acquire market power 
often engage in anti-competitive conduct beyond just raising prices, including, 
e.g., demanding exclusivity provisions in contracts, using market power in one 
market to demand better pricing and terms in another market, and/or tying the 
sale of other, unwanted products to the sale of a product over which they have 
market power.147 Plaintiffs may sue based on each of these types of conduct, and 
market power is a prerequisite for each.148  
Determining the “relevant market” in an antitrust case is a two-part 
calculation that “is a collection of products and geographic locations, delineated 
as part of an inquiry aimed at making inferences about market power and 
anticompetitive effect.”149 The terms “relevant market” and “antitrust market” 
are used “to distinguish these markets from what business executives and 
consultants might define for other purposes.”150 The determination of relevant 
market is two-part in that it requires one to define both (1) a product market and 
(2) a geographic market,151 which are distinct, yet intertwined. The product 
market is bounded by “the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”152 Once 
determined, the product market serves to define the geographic market, which 
“extends to the area of effective competition where buyers can turn for 
alternative sources of supply” of the product at issue.153 Or as one court 
explained, “The relevant product market identifies the products or services that 
compete with each other, and the relevant geographic market identifies the area 
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where the competition in the relevant product market takes place.”154 Or as an 
economist might explain, the inquiry looks at consumer substitution patterns to 
determine the metes and bounds of both product and geographic markets. 
The FTC and DOJ’s jointly issued Horizontal Merger Guidelines are the 
source for one of the main tests used in relevant market definition. The test, first 
included in the 1982 version of the Guidelines, aids in product as well as 
geographic market definition, where it continues to play a role in the new 
workshopped models discussed herein. Thus, it is explained here prior to the 
other aspects of the development of market definition models. The test aims to 
determine consumer substitution patterns, which are the basis for market 
definition. Essentially the test asks whether a monopolist in a given market could 
raise its prices above the competitive level without losing customers.155 In 
economic terms, the test determines “the smallest grouping of sales for which 
the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a ‘hypothetical 
monopolist’ with 100% of that grouping could profitably reduce output and 
increase price substantially above marginal cost.”156 Put more simply, it checks 
whether consumers will substitute for another product in response to a price hike 
of a certain size. The test uses the “small but significant non transitory increase 
in price” test (“SSNIP”) as its key metric, which is imposed, hypothetically, to 
arrive at the smallest relevant market.157 The size of the price increase used for 
the test is small; it is not so small as to not matter at all to consumers but not so 
large that it causes buyers to leave or for other sellers to enter the market.158 
Once the smallest grouping is determined, the entity’s market share in that 
market is considered to determine whether it has market power.159 In sum, the 
process aims to “find the smallest group of products or firms for which there are 
no close substitutes, thus allowing such a hypothetical monopolist to exert 
market power.”160 
a. Market Definition in Health Care 
Defining relevant markets is crucial to antitrust analysis regardless of 
industry; however, the process presents unique challenges in health care due to 
the role of health insurers, the non-price reasons for consumer behavior, and the 
differentiation in health care services. Whereas most industries present obvious 
consumers, in light of the various and overlapping players in health care markets, 
 
 154. Id. at 883. 
 155. HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 112. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 111–12. 
 160. Martin Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to Market Definition with an Application to 
the Hospital Industry 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16656, 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16656. 
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who the buyers and sellers are is much less clear.161 The role of the payor, as 
well as the distinctions between private and public payors, has become crucial 
to a proper market definition. In addition, a patient’s decision to purchase a 
particular health care service is influenced by non-price factors, including the 
recommendations of her physician, the network of her health plan or managed 
care organization, and the plans offered by her employer.162 On top of that, a 
patient is typically more willing to travel for a non-emergency or elective 
service, like a knee replacement, than for an acute one, like an appendectomy, 
or may have no choice but to travel for a specialty service that is only available 
in a few locations, like an organ transplant.  
b. Lessons from Public Enforcement 
Market definition, unlike the other challenges discussed in this article, is an 
area where the lessons from public enforcement, especially hospital merger 
cases, are instructive. As one legal expert presciently put it two decades ago: 
“The antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers by the Justice Department and the 
Federal Trade Commission is one of the most well developed and closely 
scrutinized areas of antitrust law.”163 However, at the time of this statement 
about merger analysis, the FTC may have been experts in most industries but 
was losing hospital merger challenges. After losing a series of provider merger 
challenges in the mid- and late-1990s, often involving highly concentrated 
markets, the FTC undertook to study whether those mergers subsequently 
resulted in higher prices, and whether the FTC’s market definition methodology 
used to challenge the transactions was to blame.164 The FTC’s study, aided by 
top academic economists who wrote several related papers on the issue, 
concluded that those mergers resulted in higher health care prices and the market 
definition analyses relied on by the Commission, and often, by the courts, was 
faulty.165 Thereafter, the FTC worked with economists to revise its market 
 
 161. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST: THEORY AND 
CASE STUDIES 277 (2012). 
 162. See id. at 277–78. 
 163. Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 23. 
 164. Brill, supra note 15, at 1 n.2 (citing the following FTC losses: Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cty., 38 F.3d 1184, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 
946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); California 
v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 
2000), and amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). 
 165. Brill, supra note 15, at 2, 2 n.5, 2–3 n.6 (citing the following papers: Steven Tenn, The 
Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction 22 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp 
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definition analyses for provider mergers and developed new models that have 
been the basis of the market definitions used in a string of victories by the 
FTC.166  
The key feature of the new ways to define health care markets is that they 
consider the roles of the various players in health care markets. Importantly, they 
take into account the key distinction between health care and other types of 
markets: the role of the health insurer. As explained by economist Gregory 
Vistnes in a seminal article in 2000, “Hospital competition is modeled as a two-
stage game. In the first stage, hospitals compete to be included in a plan’s 
hospital network. In the second stage, hospitals compete for a plan’s individual 
enrollees, with that competition affected by whether a hospital is in the plan’s 
network.”167 In health care, from the consumer perspective, “patients commit to 
a network of medical providers at the time they purchase their health insurance, 
 
293.pdf; Patrick S. Romano & David J. Balan, A Retrospective Analysis of Clinical Quality Effects 
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(Northwestern Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Indus. Org., Working Paper No. 0017, 2001); Cory S. 
Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of Economics on Hospital Merger 
Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 476 (2014); Cory S. Capps, Economic Analysis of 
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the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Conference on Antitrust in Healthcare (May 
4, 2012)). 
 166. Brill, supra note 15, at 3, 3–4 n.9 (citing the following FTC victories: In the Matter of 
Inova Health Sys. Found. & Prince William Health Sys., Inc., No. 9326, 2008 WL 2556051, at *1 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n June 17, 2008) (dismissing FTC complaint after the parties abandoned the 
merger); In the Matter of Reading Health Sys. & Surgical Inst. of Reading, No. 9353, 2012 WL 
6188557, at *1 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 7, 2012) (dismissing FTC complaint after the parties 
abandoned the merger); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071, 
1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (granting FTC preliminary injunction); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney 
Health Sys., Inc., 133 U.S. 1003, 1016 (2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 
Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00058-WLS, at 1 (M.D. Ga. June 5, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
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visited Nov. 12, 2017)). 
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671, 672 (2000). 
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but before they know their specific medical needs.”168 This shift in thinking, 
which led analysts to focus on insurer-provider negotiations and consumer 
preferences as they related to networks, was instrumental in developing more 
accurate ways to define health care markets. Before that, the two main methods 
of defining hospital markets in merger enforcement challenges, Elzinga-Hogarty 
and Critical Loss Analysis, had been overestimating the size of geographic 
markets, causing courts to find lower market shares and lower risks of resulting 
market power than they should have.169 Dissatisfied with the results of the older 
analyses, economists developed new market definition models. Some 
economists distinguish these models as “structural” in comparison to the 
previously used “quantitative” models,170 which essentially means that they take 
into account the role of the health insurer in determining health care prices.171 
As another economist explains, health insurers, which typically charge the 
patient only a small portion of the provider’s price, cause patients to be 
unresponsive to the true prices of the services they consume, and therefore any 
accurate model must take them into account.172 But that does not mean that 
competition does not play a role in determining health care markets.173 However, 
instead of doing so exclusively through consumer choice, competition in health 
care markets “does this through the selective contracting practices of insurance 
plans, which construct networks that attempt to optimize the tradeoff between 
comprehensiveness and costliness.”174 The substitution analysis then focuses on 
the networks, i.e., “[w]hether an insurer includes attractive providers in the 
network, and at what price, depends upon the availability of substitutable 
providers.”175 The newer analyses then also consider other stages of 
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(2009). 
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competition, including hospitals’ subsequent competition for patients or 
insurers’ competition for inclusion in plans offered to employees.176  
Plaintiffs and, correspondingly, courts have been borrowing from these 
analyses in defining markets in recent private cases—e.g., in the multi-district 
antitrust litigation against BCBS. Paraphrasing Vistnes’ article from 2000, the 
court recently explained, “Healthcare providers participate in what is known as 
two-stage competition; first they compete for inclusion in the provider networks 
of insurers’ plans, and then they compete for patients within a plan.”177 The 
related-but-distinct concept of a “two-sided market” recently received 
considerable attention following the Second Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
American Express Co. There, the court reversed the district court’s ruling in 
favor of DOJ that American Express’s “non-discrimination provisions” in its 
contracts with merchants, which prevented the merchants from steering 
consumers to use credit cards with lower fees (to be paid by the merchants), were 
anti-competitive.178 In so ruling, the Second Circuit made clear that market 
definition in such markets should not be limited to one side of the market; instead 
the analysis must look at the anti-competitive effects on the consumer and not 
just the merchant. The admonition that antitrust protects competition (and 
consumers) as opposed to competitors is not new, but competitor plaintiffs must 
make certain to clarify that their interests align with those of consumers by 
showing that the anti-competitive effects extend to consumers in the form of 
higher prices or diminished quality. For example, in Methodist, where the 
plaintiff hospital argued that exclusive dealing by its competitor with insurers 
destroyed competition in the relevant tri-county health care services market, 
both the district court and Seventh Circuit were unconvinced that harm extended 
beyond the hospital-insurer stage of the market to the hospital-patient stage.179 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the only “victim” was the plaintiff who 
had the opportunity to improve and compete against competitor hospitals for 
contracts with insurers.180 
Specifically as to product markets, the FTC has long been using “cluster 
markets” in which groups of health services are grouped together—a tactic that 
 
 176. Petitioner’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 9–10, 
Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Corp. 2014 WL 1612838 (No. 13-cv-1054) 
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(2017) (mem.). 
 178. American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 184–86, 206. 
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has become popular in private cases.181 Of course, due to dissimilarities among 
most health care services, the most accurate product markets might be defined 
as singular services.182 No one would argue that bypass surgery and hip 
replacement are the same offering. Nonetheless, the procedures both have 
features that make them comparable for antitrust analysis, e.g., they are inpatient 
procedures typically covered by both Medicare and commercial insurance plans. 
Moreover, cases are often about how a defendant’s conduct and market position 
affects the prices of multiple types of health care services, and defining a distinct 
market for each would be cumbersome and confusing. And unlike in most 
industries where “cluster markets are most often used as a convenience and not 
because they are analytically rigorous,”183 the existence of networks means that 
goods are already clustered. Cluster markets make considerable sense in an 
industry characterized by network effects, i.e., as the number and type of health 
care providers included in the network increases, the more valuable the network 
is to consumers.184  
c. Market Definition at the Pleading Stage 
Private enforcement differs from public enforcement in the degree to which 
defining markets at the pleading stage matters. As explained above, when the 
FTC files a challenge to a hospital merger, it typically does so with the benefit 
of pre-merger discovery and after having had a chance to do a full economic 
analysis of the merger’s potential effects on competition. In contrast, in a private 
case, the plaintiff usually has insufficient information about anti-competitive 
effects until the post-pleading discovery process begins. Accordingly, surviving 
a motion to dismiss is crucial. And because pleading standards have become 
more difficult to satisfy, this is no simple task.  
d. The Twiqbal Effect on Market Definition 
Defining relevant markets is a highly fact-specific inquiry, which makes 
doing so in a complaint, before the benefit of discovery, particularly challenging. 
And because market definition is a factual as opposed to a legal issue, it cannot 
be resolved at the pleading stage.185 Yet, in light of Twombly and Iqbal’s higher 
pleading standards, plaintiffs treat market definition as a discovery-phase fact 
issue at their peril. Twiqbal’s plausibility standard has crept (albeit 
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inconsistently) into courts’ evaluations of relevant market definitions at the early 
stages of cases over the past several years. Even before the Twiqbal holdings, 
some courts already used a plausibility standard to evaluate market definition at 
the pleading stage.186 Back then, many courts used “plausible” and “viable” 
interchangeably to describe the standard for relevant market definition at 
pleading.187 Now with Twiqbal in effect, some commentators have noted the 
more express application of the “plausibility” standard to the non-conspiracy 
elements of antitrust claims, including market definition.188 
In reality post-Twiqbal courts have required varying degrees of plausibility 
in regard to market definition in health care cases. Some courts have demanded 
Twiqbal-style allegations of plausible relevant markets,189 while others apply 
more forgiving standards.190 There are three main categories of such cases: (1) 
cases in which courts expressly require that plaintiffs plead “plausibility” under 
Twiqbal;191 (2) cases that more generally cite to the Twiqbal standard as 
applying to all of the claims, but not expressly to market definition (and even in 
some cases citing to pre-Twiqbal cases in the market definition analysis);192 and 
(3) cases in which the plaintiff seems to luck out by drawing a judge whose 
standard for market definition appears closer to notice pleading than either pre-
Twiqbal analyses that call for “plausibility” or “viability,” or post-Twiqbal 
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“plausibility” tests.193 Under the circumstances, plaintiffs should assume a court 
will use greater scrutiny to examine pleading stage relevant market definitions. 
In one notable recent district court case, Sidibe, the court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ claims on a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint was based 
entirely their failure to allege plausible relevant geographic markets under 
Twiqbal.194 That case was reversed and remanded to district court when the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, based on a 2008 case contemporaneous 
to Twombly but pre-Iqbal Ninth Circuit case, that fewer facts were required of 
plaintiffs in market definition at the pleading stage.195 However, the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion was unpublished and may be cold comfort for plaintiffs who 
opt to avoid Twiqbal plausibility when pleading relevant markets.  
e. Recent Trends in Product Market Definition 
Product market can be a subject of greater contention in private enforcement 
cases in health care than in public hospital merger challenges because the FTC 
and merging hospitals so often agree on the relevant product market (and conflict 
on geographic market).196 Yet, like in public enforcement cases, product market 
is less contentious than the more often dispositive issue of geographic markets, 
and fewer cases tend to be dismissed on this issue early on in litigation.197 Like 
the FTC and DOJ, most plaintiffs also distinguish health services paid for with 
government insurance from those paid for with commercial insurance in 
defining product markets,198 but this issue has come up in some recent cases. 
For example, in Marion HealthCare, LLC v. Southern Illinois HealthCare, the 
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plaintiff’s product market definition included only hospital services paid for by 
commercial insurers but not government payors.199 The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that a product market that included only 
hospital services paid for by commercial insurance, but not those same services 
when paid for by Medicare or Medicaid, was implausibly narrow.200 In doing 
so, the court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s 2009 decision in Little Rock 
Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, a case that declined to distinguish health 
care services markets based on payors, reasoning that, from the doctor’s 
perspective, the consumer’s method of payment was irrelevant and therefore 
could not be the basis of a market definition.201 Those cases appear to be the 
exception, however, and other courts in contemporaneous cases have limited 
product markets to health care services purchased by commercial payors despite 
defendants’ arguments for all payors’ inclusion.202  
Plaintiffs have also been successful in using the cluster market approach in 
health care. For example, the court accepted this strategy in the recently settled 
case of Omni Healthcare in which physician groups sued a health care 
corporation comprised of a hospital and an insurance plan, alleging the health 
care giant used its market power, gained in part from anti-competitive mergers, 
to obtain exclusive referral arrangements aimed at eliminating competitors.203 
In declining to exclude the plaintiff’s expert economist’s report, which clustered 
health services into product markets, the court explained that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has also recognized that there is ‘no barrier to combining in a single 
market a number of different products or services where that combination 
reflects commercial realities.’”204 Even more recently, a court in the antitrust 
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product market with only commercial payors was plausible because of lack of interchangeability 
with Medicare- and Medicaid-purchased health care services). 
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litigation against BCBS noted that a “cluster market” is “a concept widely 
accepted in healthcare antitrust cases and scholarly economic analyses.”205 
Because of the existence of networks in health care, this clustering finds a natural 
fit in health care product markets. In this sense, cluster markets are more a 
market reality than a litigant’s convenience and are likely to continue to gain 
traction as the plaintiff’s preferred methodology for product market definition.  
f. Recent Trends in Geographic Market Definition 
Recent antitrust health care cases also highlight the aspects of geographic 
market definition that courts appear to be most focused on at the pleading stage. 
Of course, courts demand good faith and are inclined to dismiss a complaint 
when they determine that a plaintiff’s proposed geographic market definition is 
more a gerrymandered, results-driven presentation of the facts rather than an 
accurate picture of the market at issue.206 Beyond that, plaintiffs must frame their 
geographic market definition, just as with product market definition,207 in terms 
of substitutes available to the buyer. This distinction is not new, and the notion 
of available substitutes was articulated in the seminal (but non-health care) case 
of Brown Shoe in 1962.208 Once the product market is determined, it serves to 
define the geographic market, which “extends to the area of effective 
competition where buyers can turn for alternative sources of supply” of the 
product at issue.209 
In a number of private antitrust cases over the past several years, court 
decisions have favored plaintiffs’ geographic market definitions that described 
where customers could receive health care services over those that described 
where patients actually received services. In a 2002 monopolization and tying 
case before the Fifth Circuit, the court explained that the plaintiff’s expert had 
defined the defendant hospital’s service area as coextensive with its geographic 
market instead of “where people could practicably go for inpatient services.”210 
This defect was fatal, as the court explained, “‘trade area is not necessarily the 
relevant geographic market for purposes of antitrust analysis’ because 
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geographic market evidence must take into account ‘where consumers could 
practicably go, not on where they actually go.’”211 In 2014, the district court in 
Sidibe articulated the same reason for dismissing the plaintiffs’ geographic 
market definition—the Dartmouth Atlas’ hospital service areas (routinely used 
in the health care insurance industry)—saying the definition did not work “for 
antitrust purposes” because the relevant geographic market should encompass 
the area where patients could go, not just where they typically already did go.212 
But that case was reversed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit.213 And in the BCBS 
multi-district litigation, a court recently accepted Dartmouth Atlas Hospital 
Referral Regions and Dartmouth Atlas Hospital Service Areas as relevant 
geographic markets “for the product market defined as the purchase of goods 
and services from healthcare facilities by commercial buyers.”214 Accordingly, 
the notion of where a plaintiff could go versus does go may be evolving as courts 
continue to consider how the role of the insurer affects how health care markets 
function. In other words, the network controls the geographic scope of markets 
more so than in other antitrust cases where consumers could act on preferences 
without such constraints. Plaintiffs who focus on the geographic boundaries 
related to how the network directs patients may therefore be the most successful 
in defining markets.  
2. Claim Selection 
Determining which claims to include in one of these cases based on cases 
already filed is not exactly a scientific exercise. For one, the number of cases 
filed is small. And of the cases filed, many settle before their claims are 
litigated.215 It is often easier to identify losing strategies than winning ones, but 
even then all that can be learned from a lower court opinion is how one district 
court judge saw the issue. For example, many of the cases involving providers 
and insurers involve similar facts: smaller provider sues larger provider(s) (and 
often one or more insurer) for keeping it from competing in the market for 
certain health care services in a given location. Such a case could be styled as a 
conspiracy to boycott under Sherman Act Section 1, an exclusive dealing 
arrangement under Sherman Act Section 1 or Section 2 or Clayton Act Section 
3, and/or monopolization or a conspiracy to monopolize under Sherman Act 
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Section 2, as well as anti-competitive under the relevant state antitrust statutes, 
and so on. The plaintiff’s selections determine whether the case will be 
examined under the per se doctrine or the rule of reason, what effects must be 
shown including whether the plaintiff must show it was foreclosed from dealing 
in the relevant market, and more. Of course, each case has its own specific facts 
(e.g., a plaintiff may have evidence of an outright conspiracy in one case, 
whereas another plaintiff may only have the option of suing based on the 
contracts at issue), as well as other unique circumstances like the political 
environment involved and the judge assigned. Furthermore, a plaintiff’s 
attempts to choose claims more favorable to the plaintiff’s case than the court 
believes the facts provide for can be fatal, as was the case in Elizabeth Place, 
where the court essentially held that the plaintiffs had tried to shoehorn a case 
about vertical restraints (restrictions on agreements between providers and 
payors, which would require more evidence of anti-competitive effects through 
a rule of reason analysis) into a horizontal conspiracy claim, that they might 
stand to win under per se treatment.216 Accordingly, plaintiffs are ultimately left 
to determine which claims most accurately reflect the facts of their cases, 
including the realities of the markets in which they buy or sell health care 
services or insurance. As courts continue to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of how these markets work, plaintiffs will likely be rewarded for 
such a strategy.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Private antitrust enforcement is an indispensable tool in the fight against 
market power and high prices in health care. Unlike public enforcement, private 
enforcement allows health care entities to police their own markets and 
consumers to seek redress from the effects of market power among providers 
and insurers. Besides, public enforcement is incapable of doing the entire job 
due to limited resources and or a lack of political will. Despite criticisms that 
private suits are self-interested and therefore anti-competitive, these lawsuits can 
be both self-interested and pro-competitive. The antitrust laws were written to 
take advantage of private plaintiffs’ incentives and information. Properly 
optimized, private antitrust enforcement has the potential to provide a truly 
effective complement to public antitrust enforcement as a means to addressing 
health care prices. 
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